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WAIVING THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS IN WASHINGTON-In re R., 97 Wn. 2d 182, 641 P.2d 704 (1982).
On December 16, 1980, a Washington Superior Court Judge found
Ms. "R." "gravely disabled"' as defined by the Mental Illness Act of
19732 and committed her to Western State Hospital for fourteen days of
treatment. 3 On December 30, 1980, Western State Hospital filed a petition for an additional ninety days of treatment for Ms. R., alleging that
she remained "gravely disabled." At the hearing, the attending psychiatrist gave his opinion of Ms. R.'s mental condition based upon observations and interviews with her. 4 Ms. R.'s attorney objected to the testi-

1. Ms. "R." was originally discovered wandering in traffic and speaking incoherently. She was
detained for evaluation, found to be "gravely disabled" under WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020, and
admitted to Western State Hospital for 72-hour emergency detention. On December 16, 1980, Ms.
R.'s detention was extended an additional 14 days. Appellee's Brief at 1, In re R., 97 Wn. 2d 182,
641 P.2d 704 (1982).
"Gravely disabled" is defined as "a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder:
(a) Is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his essential human
needs of health or safety." WASH. REv. CODE §71.05.020(l) (1981).
"Mental disorder" is defined as "any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions." Id. § 71.05.020(2).
2. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 71.05 (1981).
3. Ms. R. was committed to 14 days detention under WASH. REV. CODE 99 71.05.230-.240.
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05 (1981) is a detailed and elaborate statute governing the involuntary
commitment of people to mental hospitals. Section 71.05.150, which was declared unconstitutional
in 1982, states that "[w]hen a mental health professional designated by the county receives information alleging that a person, as a result of a mental disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm to
others or himself, or is gravely disabled," the health professional, upon investigation and evaluation
of the alleged facts and the "reliability and credibility of the person" providing the information, may
summon the person to appear at an evaluation and treatment facility for a 72-hour period.
Section 71.05.150 was declared unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme Court in In re Harris, 98 Wn. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982). The court said that § 71.05.150's summons procedure
violates constitutional provisions of procedural due process. 98 Wn. 2d at 287, 654 P.2d at 114.
WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.230 allows the agency providing evaluative services to petition the
court for an additional 14 days if it shows that the patient's mental disorder still presents a "likelihood of serious harm to others or himself, or [he] is gravely disabled." The court can grant an additional 14 days of involuntary treatment only after a probable cause hearing held pursuant to §
71.05.240. Section 71.05.240 states that the court must use a preponderance of evidence standard in
ruling whether the patient ought to be further detained.
Sections 71.05.280-.310 outline the procedure for 90-day involuntary commitment. Section
71.05.300 states that the patient has the right to a jury trial and § 71.05.3 10 states that the burden of
proof is that of "clear, cogent and convincing evidence." Section 71.05.280 outlines the reasons that
justify 90-day detention. Section 71.05.320 outlines the procedure for additional 180-day involuntary
treatment.
4. Ms. R.'s psychiatrist testified that Ms. R. was schizophrenic and incapable of meeting her
basic needs. Appellee's Brief at 3, In re R.
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mony, arguing that it was subject to the physician-patient privilege. 5 The
6
judge overruled the objection and ordered further detention.
On March 4, 1982, the Washington Supreme Court sustained the lower
court's ruling in In re R., 7 holding: (1) that the statutory waiver of the
physician-patient privilege in hearings for fourteen-day involuntary commitment as provided by section 71.05.250 of the Washington Revised
Code was also applicable to hearings for ninety-day commitment; and (2)
that it was reasonable not to require a non-treating psychiatrist to examine
Ms. R. The second holding is critical for two reasons. First, it changes
Washington law concerning the psychiatrist-patient relationship in involuntary commitment proceedings. 8 Second, it narrows the applicability of
the physician-patient privilege in involuntary commitment proceedings. 9
In analyzing the court's decision in In re R., this Note will first review
the physician-patient privilege. Next, it will assess the court's analysis
and application of the statutory waiver in section 71.05.250 of the Washington Revised Code to hearings for ninety-day commitment. This Note
concludes that while the court correctly applied the statutory waiver to
hearings for ninety-day commitment, the court's standard of reasonableness in applying the waiver of the privilege in this case was improper.
Because the physician-patient privilege is a valuable tool in encouraging
patients to seek therapeutic treatment, this Note recommends that the
courts require a strong showing of necessity before allowing the exercise
of the statutory waiver of the privilege.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Purposeof the Physician-PatientPrivilege
The purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to encourage the free

5. WASH REV CODE § 5.60.060(4) (Supp. 1982) states: "A regular physician or surgeon shall
not, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in
attending such patient, which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient .... "
Ms. R.'s attorney asserted that the psychiatrist's testimony was based on information he obtained
from Ms. R. after a physician-patient relationship had been established and treatment begun. In re
R., 97 Wn.2d 182, 183-84,641 P.2d 704,705 (1982).
6. The judge's stated reasons for overruling the objection were that: "(1) [Ms. R.] had waived
the physician-patient privilege because she had been given notice by the doctor that her conversation
with him might be used in proceedings under RCW 71.05; and (2) that the waiver of the physicianpatient privilege was 'necessary to effectuate the ends of that chapter in the best interests of [Ms. R.
and the State.' " Appellant's Brief at 12-13, In re R.
7. 97 Wn. 2d 182, 641 P.2d 704 (1982). Ms. R.'s attorney also argued on appeal that Ms. R.'s
constitutional right to privacy in her communication with her doctor had been violated. The Washington Supreme Court rejected this argument, and this Note will not address that issue.
8.
9.

See infra Part IIIB.
See iufra Part IC.

Waiving Physician-Patient Privilege
flow of information between patient and physician so that the patient's
sickness may be adequately treated.' 0 To that end, forty states and the
District of Columbia have enacted a physician-patient privilege. "I
Courts, however, have tended to construe the statutory privilege narrowly, holding it to be in derogation of the common law. 12 Commentators
have vigorously criticized the privilege. 13 As a result, efforts have been
10. In re R., 97 Wn. 2d 182, 186, 641 P.2d 704,706; see also State v. Boehme, 71 Wn. 2d 621,
635, 430 P.2d 527, 535 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); State v. Fackrell, 44 Wn. 2d
874, 877, 271 P.2d 679, 681 (1954); State v. Miller, 105 Wash. 475,478, 178 P. 459, 460 (1919).
11.

ALASKA R. EvID. 504; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-

1001, UNIF. R. EvID. 503 (1979); CAL. EvID. CODE § 990-1007 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(d) (Supp. 1982); DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 503; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 33, ch. 626, HAWAn R. EvID. 504;
IDAHO CODE § 9-203(4) (Supp. 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-802 (1983); IND. CODE §34-1-145 (Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427
(1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:476 (West 1981); ME. R. EvID. 503; MICH. CoMP. LAWS §
600.2157 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2157 (Callaghan 1976)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West
Supp. 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(5) (Vernon
Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 49.215-.245 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. § 329:26 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A22.2 (1976); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4504 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53
(1981); N.D. R. EvID. 503; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B) (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2503 (West Supp. 1983); OR. R. EvID. 504-1; PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5929 (Purdon
1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4 (Cum. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 88 19-13-6 to -11
(1979); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-24-8(4) (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 8.01-399 (1977); WASH.
REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West Supp. 1983-84); Wyo.
STAT. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (1977).
Of those states that do not have a physician-patient privilege, five have psychiatrist-patient privileges: ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(d) (West Supp. 1983);
KY. REV. STAT. § 421.215 (1978); MD. CTS. & JUDIC. PROc. ANN. § 9-109 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-207 (1980). Three other states without a physician-patient privilege have a psychotherapistpatient privilege: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, §20B (Michie/
Law. Co-op. 1975 & Supp. 1983); N.M. R. EvID. 504. Only two states-South Carolina and West
Virginia-have none of the above statutory privileges.
12. See, e.g., Randa v. Bear, 50Wn. 2d 415,420,312P.2d 640, 644(1957) ("the statute creating
the [physician-patient] privilege, being in derogation of the common law, should be construed
strictly"); Ih re Dodge, 29 Wn. App. 486,492,628 P.2d 1343, 1347 (1981) ("statutory exceptions to
the [physician-patient] privilege should be read more broadly than the privilege itself").
Wigmore argues that the physician-patient privilege was not recognized at common law because it
meets only the third of his four requirements for recognizing a privilege at common law. 8 J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2380a, at 829-30 (rev. ed. 1961). Those four requirements are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentialitymust be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of
the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must
be greaterthan the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation.
Id. §2285, at 527.
13. Saltzburg, Privilegesand Professionals:Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597,
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made to repeal the privilege, but they have met with little success. In
general, the Federal Rules of Evidence leave the creation of privileges to
the states. 14
B.

The DistinctionBetween Treatment andEvaluation

Courts distinguish between treatment and evaluation in applying the
physician-patient privilege because the purpose of the privilege is to encourage and protect only the treatment relationship. 15 Because evaluative
examinations are not within the purpose of the privilege, a majority of
courts do not apply the physician-patient privilege to information gained
by a physician conducting a forensic or evaluative examination. 16
617 (1980). Professor Saltzburg gives three reasons why the privilege is so criticized: (1) Few patients would jeopardize their treatment by lying to their physicians out of fear that the information
they disclose may be later used against them in court: (2) Few patients even know the privilege exists
in the first place: and (3) The privilege has such a narrow scope that its effectiveness is negligible. Id.
Professor McCormick has also called for abolishment of the privilege: "'IThe privilege in the main
operates not as the shield of privacy but as the protector of fraud. Consequently the abandonment of
the privilege seems the best solution." MCCORMICK. HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW ON EVIDENCE § 105. at

228 (2d ed. 1972).
These criticisms in general have focused on the doctor-patient relationship rather than the psychiatrist-patient relationship, although the latter is often placed under the physician-patient privilege
heading as it was in It re R. The reason for making the distinction between a doctor-patient and a
psychiatrist-patient relationship is that while courts and commentators are less willing to believe that
the physician-patient privilege actually benefits doctor-patient relationships, there is a growing belief
that the privilege's protection is necessary for effective psychotherapeutic treatment. See infra notes
45-49 & 51-53 and accompanying text.
14. Rule 501 states that the rule of privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States." FED R. EvID 501. Furthermore.
the rule states that in civil actions "as to which State law supplies the rule of decision. the privilege of
a witness [or] person ... shall be determined in accordance with State law." Id.
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court prescribed Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
which contained 13 rules dealing with privileges. Among these rules was a psychotherapist-patient
privilege but no physician-patient privilege. FED. R. EvID 501 report of House Committee on the
Judiciary. Congress changed this, however, substituting the single Rule 501, which left the law of
privileges in its present state. The House Report stated that federal law ought not to ".supercede that
of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling reason." Id.. Thus. Rule 501
requires application of state privilege law in proceedings governed by Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). Fto R. EvID 501 report of House Committee on the Judiciary.
15. IltreR..97Wn. 2d 182, 186,641 P. 2d 704. 706(1982) (citing State v. Boehme, 71 Wn. 2d
621. 635, 430 P.2d 527. 536 (1967). cert. dented. 390 U.S. 1013 (1968)): State v. Miller. 105
Wash. 475, 478, 178 P. 459.460 (1919).
For examples of courts applying the privilege to a treating psychiatrist, see State v. O'Neill. 274
Or. 59, 545 P.2d 97 (1976) (patient held for treatment is entitled to the physician-patient privilege):
In re Miller, 51 Or. App. 285, 624 P.2d 1100 (1981) (patient's treating physician's testimony is
privileged): and People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980) (where patient had orginally sought
voluntary treatment and her psychiatrist petitioned the court for a longer detention period, alleging
that the patient would no longer remain in the voluntary treatment program, the physician-patient
privilege applied.)
16. McCoRsttcK, supra note 13. § 99, at 214 n. 15; see. e.g., Triplett v. Board of Social Protec-

Waiving Physician-Patient Privilege
Washington case law also recognizes the distinction between treatment
and evaluation. 17 Furthermore, Washington courts have recognized the
physician-patient privilege in examinations "by non-treating physicians if
the patient believed it was for treatment purposes.1 8 This standard is a
subjective one and illustrates Washington's focus on the patient and his or
her perceptions in determining the applicability of the privilege.

tion, 528 P.2d 563 (Or. App. 1974); Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 965 (1969).
For examples of courts requiring evidence that the psychiatrist received his or her information
while treating the patient before recognizing the privilege's applicability, see State v. Shaw, 106
Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715, 718 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); State v. Boehme, 71 Wn.
2d 621, 635, 430 P.2d 527, 535-36 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); State v. Sullivan, 60
Wn. 2d 214, 223-24, 373 P.2d 474, 479-81 (1962); and State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Martin, 19
Or. App. 28, 526 P.2d 647 (1974), rev'd, 271 Or. 603, 533 P.2d 780 (1975). See also Orland,
Evidence in PsychiatricSettings, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 665, 679 (1976) (noting that "[tihe traditional
approach distinguishing between the forensic examination and the treating relationship is rational").
17. The leading decision is State v. Sullivan, 60 Wn. 2d 214, 373 P.2d 474 (1962). In Sullivan.
the Washington Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for a lower court to allow a psychiatrist who had treated the defendant while the defendant was involuntarily committed to testify about
statements the defendant had made to him during the period of examination and treatment. The court
said that since the psychiatrist had treated the patient, the information he obtained was subject to the
physician-patient privilege. Id. at 224-26, 373 P.2d at 480-8 1.
The Sullivan court based its reasoning in part on an earlier Washington case, State v. Fackrell, 44
Wn. 2d 874, 271 P.2d 679 (1954). The Fackrellcourt had held that the physician-patient privilege
did not apply to a witness who had been examined by a doctor for the purpose of establishing the
crime of rape, stating that since the witness had received no treatment, the privilege ought not apply.
Id. at 877-78, 271 P.2d at 680-81.
The Sullivan court approved the Fackrellcourt's limitation of the privilege to treating physicians,
stating that "the [forensic] examination is not for the purpose of treatment, but for the publication of
results." State v. Sullivan, 60 Wn. 2d at 223-24, 373 P.2d at 479; see also State v. Thomas, I Wn.
2d 298, 95 P.2d 1036 (1939); State v. Winnett, 48 Wash. 93, 92 P. 904 (1907).
18. In Ballard v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Wn. 2d 67, 145 P.2d 1019 (1944), the patient was injured
by a taxicab and taken to a hospital where she was examined by a physician. The patient assumed that
the examiner was a staff physician on duty at the hospital. The physician, however, was employed by
and made the examination on behalf of the taxicab company. The Washington Supreme Court held
that even though the physician examined the patient in a non-treating capacity, the fact that the patient believed she was being examined for treatment purposes was sufficient reason for applying the
physician-patient privilege. Id. at 71-72, 145 P.2d at 1021-22.
The court justified its reasoning in part by quoting a Missouri court decision:
"It is not necessary in order to create the relation of physician and patient that he should
actually treat the patient. If he makes an examination of the patient, with her knowledge and
consent, she believing that the examination is being made for the purpose of treating her, then
the relation is created by implication.. .. "
Ballard v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Wn. 2d at 72, 145 P.2d at 1022 (quoting Smart v. Kansas City, 208
Mo. 162, 105 S.W. 709, 717 (1907)); see also Sumpter v. National Grocery Co., 194 Wash. 598, 78
P.2d 1087 (1938) (the privilege applied when a physician who originally had been called in and
consulted by the patient's regular physician made a subsequent examination on behalf of the opposing
party without the patient's knowledge of any change in the physician's capacity).
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The Applicability of the Physician-PatientPrivilege in Involuntary
Commitment Hearings

Reported decisions from other states have not considered a statutory
waiver of the physician-patient privilege in involuntary commitment proceedings. Courts have split, however, on the general applicability of the
physician-patient privilege in involuntary commitment proceedings. 19
In Washington, the legislature has foreclosed the general question of
whether the privilege applies at all to involuntary commitment proceedings. In limited circumstances, section 71.05.250 of the Revised Code of
Washington allows the waiver of the privilege in proceedings for fourteen-day involuntary commitment. By permitting the waiver of the physician-patient privilege, the legislature has implied that the privilege ap20
plies unless waived.
19. Courts that deny the applicability of the physician-patient privilege to involuntary commitment proceedings offer several justifications. The first is that the state, acting as parens patriae. has
"the power and the duty to promote the interests and welfare of its citizens" by committing people
needing treatment. Inre Sonsteng, 573 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Mont. 1978). The second reason is that the
state's police power permits the state, for public safety reasons, to commit persons whose mental
disorder may cause injury to themselves or others. Id. at 1153-54. With either reason, "the state
interests entailed by the two powers necessitate dispensing with the various forms of physician/patient privilege.- Id. at 1154.
A third reason is that the physician-patient privilege has no application to involuntary commitment
proceedings unless the patient first voluntarily consulted the physician, for the purpose of the privilege--encouraging voluntary disclosure-is frustrated by. and has little effect in. involuntary relationships. Inre Winstead. 67 Ohio App. 2d 111, 425 N.E.2d 943, 945 (1980).
A fourth reason is that since involuntary commitment proceedings are for the benefit of the patient.
the privilege is unnecessary. Ordinarily, privileges apply in adversarial proceedings, which are. by
their nature, for the benefit of neither party. Privileges are considered necessary to protect the holder
of a privilege from improper inquiry and discovery, and to ensure that the holder's rights are protected. Involuntary commitment proceedings, however, are not adversarial and exist for the protection of both the public and patient. This difference greatly reduces the need for the privilege and its
value, so long as the patient is accorded "scrupulous due process protection." In re R.. 97 Win. 2d
182, 187. 641 P.2d 704, 706 (1982).
Other courts argue that there is therapeutic value in preserving confidentiality in the physicianpatient relationship. In People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980), the patient entered avoluntary
treatment program at a private hospital. Later her treating psychiatrist filed a certification for ShortTerm Treatment at the Colorado State Hospital, alleging that despite her acceptance of voluntary
treatment, he believed she might not remain in the voluntary program. The Colorado Supreme Court
held that the physician-patient privilege applied, stating that (1) the privilege encourages voluntary
treatment, and (2) nothing in the Colorado statutes suggested that the privilege ought not to apply. Id.
at 1140.
20. WASH REV CODE § 71.05.250 (198 1) begins by outlining five rights a detained person has in
his or her hearing to determine if a 14-day detention is justified. The five rights specified are:
(I) To present evidence on his behalf(2) To cross-examine witnesses who testify against him:
(3) To be proceeded against by the rules of evidence:
(4) To remain silent:
(5) To view and cop) all petitions and reports in the court file.

Waiving Physician-Patient Privilege
The court in In re R. acknowledged that section 71.05.250 of the
Washington Revised Code contemplates that non-treating psychiatrists
evaluate patients. 2 1 In order to waive the physician-patient privilege, a
court must find that it is unreasonable for a non-treating psychiatrist to
evaluate the patient. Thus, the waiver provision also maintains the treatment/evaluation distinction that Washington case law recognizes in phy22
sician-patient privilege cases.
Section 71.05.250 applies to proceedings for fourteen-day commitment. There is no comparable section in the provisions governing proceedings for ninety-day commitment, though section 71.05.310, which
Section 71.05.250 then allows for a waiver of the physician-patient privilege with the following
provision:
The physician-patient privilege shall be deemed waived in proceedings under this chapter
when a court of competent jurisdiction in its discretion determines that it is unreasonable for the
petitioner seeking the fourteen-day involuntary treatment to obtain a sufficient evaluation of the
detained person by a psychiatrist or psychologist or other health professional and such waiver is
necessary in the opinion of the court to protect either the detained person or the public.
Id.
The waiver's scope is limited, however, by the following provision:
Whenever the physician-patient privilege is deemed waived pursuant to this section, the
waiver shall be limited to the introduction of relevant and competent medical records or testimony of an evaluation or treatment facility or its staff, or a facility certified for ninety-day treatment by the department of social and health services or its staff for the purpose of meeting
evaluation requirements contained in chapter 10.77 R.C.W. and chapter 71.12 R.C.W.: Provided however, That the physician-patient privilege shall not be waived if the physician specifically identifies himself to the detained person as one who is communicating with that person for
treatment only: And provided fiurther, That the privilege shall not extend to incident reports
involving the detained person.
Id.
In addition to the rights spelled out in § 71.05.250, the patient is also guaranteed other rights.
Section 71.05.010 states that the patient's individual rights in involuntary commitment proceedings
shall be protected and legal disabilities arising from the commitment eliminated. Section 71.05.060
states that a person who is detained under WASH. REv. CODE ch. 71.05 "shall not forfeit any legal
right or suffer any legal disability as a consequence of any actions taken or orders made, other than as
specifically provided in this chapter." Section 71.05.360 states that "[elvery person involuntarily
detained or committed under the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to all the rights set forth in
this chapter and shall retain all rights not denied to him under this chapter." Section 71.05.450 states
that "[n]o person shall ...lose any civil rights as a consequence of receiving evaluation or treatment
for mental disorder."
21. InreR.,97Wn. 2d 182, 188,641 P.2d704,707(1982).
22. The treatment-evaluation distinction that Washington case law recognizes in physician-patient privilege cases existed at the time that WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.250 (198 1) was enacted. Thus,
the legislature can be attributed with knowledge of this distinction. As noted above, § 71.05.250 is
set up so as to only allow waiver of the physician-patient privilege in limited circumstances within the
involuntary commitment process. See supranote 20 and accompanying text. Thus, § 71.05.250 cannot be read as a total abrogation of the physician-patient privilege's applicability to all future treating
psychiatrist-patient relationships. Section 71.05.250 can be read, however, as (1)legislative recognition that the treatment-evaluation distinction exists in Washington; and (2) a measure enacted to abrogate that distinction in limited circumstances, thus acting as a modification, but not elimination, of
the treatment-evaluation distinction.
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governs proceedings for ninety-day commitment, incorporates the due
process guarantees and the evidence rules of section 71.05.250.23 Thus,
in In re R., the Washington Supreme Court had to first consider whether
the waiver of the physician-patient privilege in section 71.05.250 is applicable to ninety-day commitment hearings under section 71.05.310 before
deciding how the waiver should be applied.
1I.

THE COURT'S REASONING

In In re R., the court held: (1) that the provision in section 71.05.250
for waiver of the physician-patient privilege in proceedings for fourteenday involuntary commitment was incorporated into the provisions governing involuntary commitment for ninety days; and (2) that exercising
the waiver in this case was appropriate because requiring a non-treating
physician to examine Ms. R. was unreasonable. 24
The court asserted that the waiver provision of section 71.05.250 is
"adaptable to other [involuntary] proceedings." 25 Citing the reference to
section 71.05.250 that appears in section 71.05.310,26 the court concluded that "[in providing that the 90-day extension hearing shall accord
with the rules of evidence pursuant to R.C.W. § 71.05.250, the legislature did not exclude the provision for waiver of the physician-patient privilege. '27
In applying the waiver of the physician-patient privilege to hearings for
ninety-day commitment, the court stated that the purposes of the privilege
and the waiver are the same. 28 The court noted that the purpose of the
privilege is to benefit the patient by encouraging the free flow of information between patient and physician so that the patient's sickness may be
adequately treated. 29 The waiver of the privilege is also designed to benefit the patient by facilitating treatment. 30 The court specifically mentioned
23. WASH REV- CODE § 71.05.310 (1981) states in pertinent part: "The person shall be present
at such proceeding, which shall in all respects accord with the constitutional guarantees of due process of law and the rules of evidence pursuant to R.C.W. 71.05.250."
24.

In re R.. 97 Wn. 2d 182, 189,641 P.2d 704, 707-08 (1982).

25. Id. at186. 641 P.2d at706.
26. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
27. litre R.,97Wn. 2d 182, 186,641 P.2d 704, 706 (1982).
28. Id. The court chose to incorporate WASH. REV CODE § 71.05.250 into
§ 71.05.310 by following what it called the "spirit of the law." In re R., 97 Wn. 2d at 187, 641 P.2d at 707. In other
words, where there are two or more possible interpretations of a statute's meaning, the one which
best furthers the legislature's intent and purpose ought to be followed. Id. (citing
Hart v. People's
Nat'l Bank. 91 Wn. 2d 197, 588 P.2d 204 (1978)).
29. lit re R.. 97 Wn. 2d at 186, 641 P.2d at 706 (citing State v. Boehme, 71 Wn. 2d 621. 430
P.2d 527 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968)); State v. Miller, 105 Wash. 475, 178 P. 459
(1919).

30. InreR.,97 Wn.2dat 187. 641 P.2dat707.

Waiving Physician-Patient Privilege
at least one way that the waiver is beneficial to the patient: given the difficulty of diagnosing mental illness, the waiver of the physician-patient
privilege may make it easier for the petitioner to meet its burden of proof
in detaining the patient for further treatment. Without the waiver, persons
in serious need of treatment may be dismissed from a mental hospital. 31
The court denied that the waiver of the physician-patient privilege in
involuntary commitment hearings will make patients more reluctant to
confide in the psychiatrists who treat them. 32 The court reasoned that involuntarily committed patients, already "hospitalized against their will
[and] unable to recognize their need for help," are likely to resist treatment and confidences associated with it in any event. 33 Thus, the court
34
noted that the privilege is of little value in such circumstances.
Holding that section 71.05.250 of the Washington Revised Code does
apply to hearings seeking ninety-day detention, the court also held that
section 71.05.250 did not require that a non-treating psychiatrist evaluate
Ms. R. The court held that an evaluation by a non-treating psychiatrist in
this case was unreasonable for two reasons. First, a treating physician is
often much more able to testify about the patient's condition than one
who conducts a simple evaluative examination; the symptoms of mental
illness tend to be sporadic rather than continuous. 35 Second, the court
agreed with Western State Hospital's assertion that prohibiting treating
psychiatrists from testifying would be an "irrational use of . . . resources. "36 The hospital had argued that the bifurcation of psychiatric
duties between treating and non-treating psychiatrists would reduce treat37
ment time for each patient.
III.

ANALYSIS

Although the court correctly held that the waiver of the physician-patient privilege in hearings for fourteen-day commitment also applied to
hearings for ninety-day commitment, the court allowed the waiver provision to be incorrectly used in In re R. by applying an inappropriate standard of reasonableness under the statute. The court reached its conclusion
based upon two false assumptions: first, that the physician-patient privi31. Id. at 188, 641 P.2d at 707.
32. Id. at 187, 641 P.2d at 706-707.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 188, 641 P.2d at 707.
36. Id.
37. Id. Because the Hospital's entire staff is used in the treatment of patients, a bifurcation of
duties would put treatment personnel in evaluative positions and force them to review other treating
psychiatrists' cases.
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lege has little value in cases such as In re R.; 38 and, second, that the
exercise of the waiver in circumstances like those in In re R. is beneficial
39
to the patient.
A.

Waiver of the Physician-PatientPrivilege Under Section 71.05.250

Section 71.05.250 of the Revised Code of Washington states that before the privilege is waived, a court must determine: (1) "that it is unreasonable for the petitioner seeking fourteen-day involuntary treatment to
obtain a sufficient evaluation of the detained person"; and (2) -[that]
such a waiver is necessary in the opinion of the court to protect either the
detained person or the public.' 40
I.

Satisfying the Waiver Provisionsin Section 71.05.250-The
ReasonablenessTest

The court's holding that it is unreasonable to require non-treating physicians to evaluate patients like Ms. R. was based in part on two assertions that do not withstand analysis: (1) that treating psychiatrists are in a
41
better position to testify about a patient than evaluating psychiatrists;
and (2) that any bifurcation of psychiatric duties between treating and
non-treating psychiatrists would require a reduction in both the number of
treating personnel 42 and the amount and quality of professional time that
43
each patient would receive.
The Washington Supreme Court accepted the first assertion although
acknowledging that the bifurcation of duties between treating and non38. Id.
39. Id. at 186. 641 P.2d at 706.
40. WASIH Rt-v CODE § 71.05.250 (1981).
41. It re R., 97 Wn. 2d 182, 188. 641 P.2d 704. 707 (1982). As mentioned, the court stated that
mental illness tends to be sporadic, which puts a treating physician in a better position to testify about
a pattent than an evaluative physician. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. The court did not
state in its opinion, however, whether there was any evidence to indicate that Ms. R.'s mental illness
was in fact sporadic. The state's brief made no such assertion either. If the court is going to waive the
physician-patient privilege and allow treating psychiatrists to testify because mental illness tends to
be sporadic, then it would seem reasonable to require a showing that the case at hand is one that
involves a sporadic mental illness before exercising the waiver.
Of course, there would not have been an issue here had Ms. R. been evaluated by a non-treating
physician. for, as mentioned. Washington case law does not afford any application of the physicianpatient privilege to such circumstances. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. Ms. R. was
evaluated and testilied against, however, by her treating psychiatrist. The court stated that it was not
necessary for a non-treating psychiatrist to have evaluated Ms. R.. agreeing with Western State Hospital that such a requtrement is unreasonable. l1 re R.. 97 Wn. 2d at 189. 641 P.2d at 708.
42. Id.
43
Id
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treating psychiatrists is done at other Washington mental health institutions. 44 This fact suggests that some health officials believe that nontreating psychiatrists can adequately evaluate patients and determine
those who need to be detained for further treatment.
With respect to the second assertion, it is uncertain that any bifurcation
of duties would necessarily reduce treatment time, for the time a treating
psychiatrist would gain by being relieved of evaluative duties, such as
testing and testifying in court, ought to approximate the amount of treatment time lost by making some treating psychiatrists evaluators.
The argument against the bifurcation of treating and non-treating psychiatric duties assumes that any reduction in the amount of treatment time
would mean a corresponding reduction in the effectiveness and quality of
the treatment. This assumption is offset by a large body of legal and medical research, which indicates that the opportunity for effective therapeutic treatment is severely limited when a treating psychiatrist cannot guarantee confidentiality. 45 Guaranteeing confidentiality in the psychiatristpatient relationship improves the quality of treatment enough to compensate for any reductions in treatment time due to the bifurcation of psychiatric duties.
The Washington Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of
protecting confidentiality in the psychiatrist-patient relationship. In State
v. Sullivan, 46 the court incorporated the following often-quoted rationale
from Taylor v. United States:47
In regard to mental patients, the policy behind such a statute is particularly clear and strong. Many physical ailments might be treated with some
degree of effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a
psychiatrist must have his patient's confidence or he cannot help him. "The
psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He
exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays
bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most
patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be expected
of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condition ....

It would

be too much to expect them to do so if they knew that all they say-and all
that the psychiatrist learns from what they say-may be revealed to the
whole world from a witness stand."
Psychiatrists have long asserted the necessity of confidentiality in the

44.
45.
46.

King County Hospital is one such example. Id. at 188, 641 P.2d at 707.
See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
60 Wn. 2d 214,225,373 P.2d 474,480(1962).

47. 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quoting M. GutrMACHER & H. WEHOFEN. PSYCHIATRY
ANDTHE LAW 272 (1952)).
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psychiatrist-patient relationship. 48 Confidentiality is particularly important between the treating psychiatrist and the involuntarily committed patient. Usually, the psychiatrist explains to an involuntarily committed patient that he or she, the psychiatrist, had nothing to do with the
commitment. The psychiatrist does this in order to deflect any anger or
anxiety arising from the patient's commitment. Next, the psychiatrist explains to the patient that since the state will detain the patient until he or
she responds to treatment, he or she should try to establish the type of
treatment relationship that will help the patient return to society. 49 But if
the patient also knows that everything he or she reveals to the psychiatrist
may later be disclosed publicly, then the incentive to seek treatment is
greatly reduced.
By allowing the patient's treating psychiatrist to testify without giving
proper respect to the physician-patient privilege, the court has created the
potential for less effective treatment of the involuntarily committed patient. Less effective treatment results in longer periods of detention for
the patient in mental institutions. This frustrates the legislature's purpose
in enacting chapter 71.05 of the Washington Revised Code: to provide
"prompt evaluation and short term treatment of persons with serious
mental disorders." 50
A major flaw in the court's analysis is that it failed to consider the fact
that the relationship between Ms. R. and her psychiatrist is more than just
a doctor-patient relationship. It is a psychiatrist-patient relationship, too.
In the past, when the court stated that the physician-patient privilege

48. One commentator describes the literature arguing the need for confidentiality in the psychotherapeutic relationship as "massive." Orland, supra note 16, at 677 n.59.
Surveys conducted attempting to verify empirically the arguments in support of the psychiatristpatient privilege have been inconclusive. See, e.g., Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An
Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C.L. REv 895 (1982); Note.
Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects ofTarasoff. 31
STAN L. REV 165 (1978): Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:
Its Inplicationsfor the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962). The results

of most surveys are that there is no real empirical evidence that shows that "elimination or restriction
of the privilege would seriously affect the profession: nor is there evidence that people are deterred
from seeking help in states where there is no privilege." Note, The Scope of the Psychologist-Patient
Testimonial Privilege in Utah, 1980 UTAH L. REV 385, 387. But such studies themselves may be

seriously flawed, because the testing for evidence of the importance of deterrence or confidentiality is
extremely difficult to prove or disprove empirically. Fleming & Maximov, The Patient orHis Victim:
The Therapist's Dilemmna, 62 CAL L. REV. 1025, 1039 n.63 (1974). In addition to the issue of confidentiality, many other factors are involved in the decision to seek treatment. Two commentators
assert that empirically testing the efficacy of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is "as elusive of
determination as the deterrent impact on crime of any specific penalty. " Id.
49. Orland. supra note 16, at 676-77.
50.

WASH REv CODE§71.05.010(2)(1981).
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ought to be construed strictly since it is in derogation of the common law,
it was dealing with cases involving doctor-patient relationships. 5 1
Such a narrow construction of the privilege, however, has not been
applied to cases involving a psychiatrist-patient relationship. The Sullivan
decision 52 illustrates how the courts have liberally applied the privilege to
treating psychiatrist-patient relationships .53
2.

Satisfying Section 71.05.250's Waiver Provisions-TheBenefit of
the Waiver

The court concluded that the waiver of the physician-patient privilege
benefits the involuntarily committed, while the privilege itself is of "little
value.' '54 But these conclusions contradict the views of many legal and
medical scholars. 55 It is not disputed that the waiver of the physicianpatient privilege in section 71.05.250 was designed for the patient's bene51. See, e.g., Department of Social and Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wn. 2d 812, 819-20, 601
P.2d 520, 525 (1979) (privilege held to be inapplicable to subpoena of medical records of Medicaid
patients for auditing purposes); State v. Boheme, 71 Wn. 2d 621,634-37,430 P.2d 527, 536 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968) (rape victim unsuccessfully attempted to exercise privilege in the
criminal trial of the alleged rapist); Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn. 2d 415, 420, 312 P.2d 640, 644 (1957)
(patient suing hospital on medical service contract waived the privilege as to medical records of
patient's ailments kept by the hospital).
52. State v. Sullivan, 60 Wn. 2d 214, 373 P.2d 474 (1962), discussed supra at notes 17 & 46-47
and accompanying text.
53. Other courts, too, have been very liberal in protecting the psychiatrist-patient relationship. In
Alfred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court, using Wigmore's four-part
test for whether a privilege exists at common law, J. WIGMORE. supra note 12, at 829-30, held that
there is a common law privilege for a psychiatrist-patient relationship. Allred, 554 P.2d at 417. Said
the court: "Reason indicates that the absence of a privilege would make it doubtful whether either
psychotherapists or their patients could communicate effectively if it were thought that what they said
could be disclosed compulsorily in a court of law." Id. at 418.
The California Supreme Court in In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1970), held that the psychiatrist-patient privilege has constitutional underpinnings. Also of significance, the court stated:
Even commentators who concurred in the criticism of the general physician-patient privilege
noted that the psychotherapeutic privilege rested on a much sounder basis .... The differences
that exist between these two medically oriented privileges caution against blind application of
the precedents of the physician-patient privilege in future psychotherapist-patient privilege
cases.
Id. at 434 n.20, 467 P.2d at 570 n.20, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.20.
California courts have also stated that the psychotherapist-patient privilege ought to be liberally
construed in the patient's favor. Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 337, 508 P.2d 309, 313,
107 Cal. Rptr. 309, 313 (1973); see also In re B., 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419, 425 (1978) ("[w]e
conclude that in Pennsylvania, an individual's interest in preventing the disclosure of information
revealed in the context of a psychotherapist-patient relationship has deeper roots than the Pennsylvania doctor-patient privilege statute, and that the patient's right to prevent disclosure of such information is constitutionally based").
54. In re R., 97 Wn. 2d 182, 187,641 P.2d 704,706(1982).
55. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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fit. The issue, however, is the type of treatment that results by improperly
allowing the waiver of the privilege in a treating psychiatrist-patient relationship. Waiver of the privilege in a treatment relationship often may do
more harm than good to the patient by reducing the chance for effective
treatment.
When a court applies the reasonableness test of section 71.05.25056
consistent with the respect for the psychiatrist-patient relationship shown
in prior decisions, the patient is accorded maximum benefit. The reasonableness test should also be applied consistently with the large body of
legal and medical evidence arguing that confidentiality is beneficial to the
treating psychiatrist-patient relationship. Thus, a strong showing of necessity should be required before waiving the privilege.
3.

A ProposedTest for Applying the Waiver Provisionof Section
71.05.250

The waiver is designed to benefit the patient. Accordingly, the waiver
of the physician-patient privilege in a treating psychiatrist-patient relationship should only be allowed when the following two conditions are
met. First, an evaluative psychiatrist must testify that he or she is unable
to make an adequate assessment of the patient for lack of treatment records or history, or because the patient's illness is unduly sporadic. Second. the patient's treating psychiatrist must be willing to testify against
the patient and sign an affidavit stating that waiver of the privilege in this
particular case would not harm the psychiatrist-patient relationship. 57
Such a test would protect the treatment relationship by permitting the
waiver when the patient's interests-both medical and legal-would best
be served. At the same time, the state would still have the necessary
means for evaluating and committing patients who need treatment, thus
protecting the state's interests in the matter. With both results, the patient
is benefited.
The court correctly held that section 71.05.250's waiver provision in
hearings for fourteen-day commitment should be applicable to hearings
for ninety-day commitment as well. 58 As a corollary, section 71.05.250's

56. See supra Part lIlIA.
57. Of course, the patient should be granted the opportunity to rebut the psychiatrist's testimony.
58. Without the incorporation of WASH REV CODE § 71.05.250 into § 71.05.310. there would
have been no statutory authority for waiving the privilege in 90-day hearings. By ruling that §
71.05.250 is incorporated into § 71.05.310, however, the court could then decide whether §
71.05.250's waiver provisions were satisfied and the privilege waived in the case of Ms. R. The court
ruled correctly in incorporating § 71.05.250 into § 71.05.310. Section 71.05.250 is easily adaptable
to other hearings, and there is no indication that the legislature intended its waiver provisions to apply
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contemplation that evaluations be conducted by non-treating psychiatrists, as well as the principles involved in deciding whether section
71.05.250's waiver of the physician-patient privilege ought to be allowed, should also be applicable to hearings for ninety-day commitment.
Thus, section 71.05.250's two-part test for determining whether the
waiver of the physician-patient privilege should be allowed was not met
on either account: (1) it is not unreasonable to require that non-treating
psychiatrists evaluate patients; and (2) the waiver benefits the patient
most when a court gives the physician-patient privilege adequate weight
and considers the respect accorded the psychiatrist-patient relationship by
Washington case law. The privilege should only be waived in treatment
relationship cases when the patient's evaluative and treating psychiatrists
testify that non-treatment evaluation is impossible and waiving the privilege will not harm the patient.
It is unfortunate that part of the reason the court waived the physicianpatient privilege in In re R. was because of Western State Hospital's manpower problems. This is in flagrant violation of the legislature's intent in
enacting chapter 71.05 of the Washington Revised Code: to safeguard
individual rights. 59 In this case, Ms R. 's legal right-the right to the physician-patient privilege-was sacrificed in part because of one hospital's
staffing problems.
B. Result of the Decision
The court's lax standard for waiver of the physician-patient privilege
allows a treating psychiatrist broad latitude to testify against a mental paonly in 14-day commitment hearings and not 90-day hearings. In re R., 97 Wn. 2d 182, 186, 641
P.2d 704, 706 (1982).
The court said it followed the "spirit of the law" over the "letter of the law" in holding that §
71.05.250 is applicable to and incorporated into § 71.05.310. In re R., 97 Wn. 2d at 187-88, 641
P.2d at 707. Not only may this be the "spirit of the law" but it seems to be the "letter of the law,"
too, since § 71.05.310 does say that the rules of evidence in § 71.05.250 shall apply.
The court, however, failed to follow its "spirit of the law" guideline with respect to the rest of its
decision. Already mentioned was the court's acknowledgment but refusal to hold what WASH. REv.
CODE § 71.05.250 contemplates-that non-treating physicians conduct the evaluative examinations.
In re R., 97 Wn. 2d at 188, 641 P.2d at 707. If the "spirit of the law" had been followed, the court
would have given effect to what § 71.05.250 contemplates. Unfortunately and inconsistently, the
court did not do this. Moreover, based upon past Washington Supreme Court decisions strongly
supporting the physician-patient privilege, see State v. Boheme, 97 Wn. 2d 621, 635, 430 P.2d 527,
535 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); State v. Sullivan, 60 Wn. 2d 214, 224-26, 373 P.2d
474, 480-81 (1962); State v. Fackrell, 44 Wn. 2d 874, 877, 271 P.2d 679, 681 (1954); State v.
Miller, 105 Wash. 475, 478, 178 P. 459, 460 (1919), and the evidence supporting the need for the
physician-patient privilege in the psychiatric treatment relationship, see supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text, following the "spirit of the law" here would certainly have required the court to
pay more deference to the privilege and not categorically disregard its value and application.
59. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.010(3) (1981).
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tient in proceedings for fourteen-day and ninety-day commitments. A lax
application of the waiver provision of section 71.05.250 of the Washington Revised Code leaves mental patients virtually without recourse to the
physician-patient privilege in proceedings for fourteen-day and ninetyday involuntary commitments. 60 As a result, the patient has the "scanty
*

.

.and ineffective" 6 1protection of only "weakly worded ethical canons

of the medical profession,"
integrity. 64
IV.

62

the Hippocratic Oath, 63 and professional

CONCLUSION

The court was correct in ruling that section 71.05.310 of the Revised
Code of Washington incorporates section 71.05.250. The court's failure
to give substance to the waiver requirements of section 71.05.250, however, is contrary to legislative intent, and does injustice to the statute and
the legal rights of the mental patient. The court should have limited the
waiver and application of section 71.05.250 to non-treating psychiatrists,
and to treating psychiatrists only when a patient's evaluating and treating
psychiatrists testify that non-treatment evaluation is impossible and
waiver of the privilege would not harm the patient. Such a result would
have been more consistent with Washington case law concerning the physician-patient privilege and the difference between treating and non-treating physicians. It would also ensure that the state can seek detention of
those needing treatment, yet preserve the treatment relationship. This
would afford a greater chance for successful and prompt treatment of the
patient. Such a result serves all interests involved. Most importantly, it
serves the welfare and interests of the patient, which should be paramount.
Brett T. DeLange
60. Even under Inre R.. 97 Wn.2d 182, 641 P.2d 704 (1982), WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.250
would still allow the physician-patient privilege to be applicable if the court finds
that § 71.05.250"s
waiver provisions were not satisfied. Also, § 71.05.250's waiver cannot be used in cases where the
treating physician "specifically identifies himself to the detained person as one who is in communication with that person for treatment only." In re R., 97 Wn. 2d 182, 641 P.2d 704 (1982). Such
instances would seem relatively rare.
61. Louisell & Sinclair, Forward: Reflections on the Law of Privileged Communications-The
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege in Perspective, 59 CAL L. REV. 30, 33 (1971).

62. Id. at 32-33.
63. "[Wlhatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession as well as outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge.
holding such things to be holy secrets." Id. at 33 n. 15.
64. Id. at 33.

